Working Papers

“Information and Disparities in Health Care Quality: Evidence from GP Choice in England” with Zach Brown, Chris Hansman, and Andre Veiga

Abstract: Low-income patients tend to receive lower quality health care. They have limited access to high quality options and—even conditional on access—are less likely to choose high performing providers. We show that differential information about provider quality is an important determinant of this disparity. Our empirical strategy exploits the temporary presence of a website that publicly displayed summary star ratings of general practitioner (GP) offices in England. Regression discontinuity (RD) estimates show that, on average, patients respond sharply to the information on the website, and that this response is almost entirely driven by residents of low-income neighborhoods. We incorporate our RD moments into a structural model of demand that allows for heterogeneity in information in addition to consumer inertia and heterogeneous preferences. Our results indicate that a meaningful fraction of the income-quality gradient could be eliminated by removing informational differences.

“Who Profits From Amateurism? Rent-Sharing in Modern College Sports” with Craig Garthwaite, Matthew J. Notowidigdo, and Nicole F. Ozminkowski (NBER Working Paper 27734)

Abstract: Intercollegiate amateur athletics in the US largely bars student-athletes from sharing in any of the profits generated by their participation, which creates substantial economic rents for universities. These rents are primarily generated by men’s football and men’s basketball programs. We characterize these economic rents using comprehensive revenue and expenses data for college athletic departments between 2006 and 2019, and we estimate rent-sharing elasticities to measure how rents flow to women’s sports and other men’s sports and lead to increased spending on facilities, coaches’ salaries, and other athletic department personnel. Using complete roster data for every student-athlete playing sports at these schools in 2018, we find that the rent-sharing effectively transfers resources away from students who are more likely to be black and more likely to come from poor neighborhoods towards students who are more likely to be white and come from higher-income neighborhoods. To understand the magnitude of the available rents, we calculate a wage structure for college athletes using the collective bargaining agreements in professional sports leagues as a benchmark. We also discuss how our results help understand how universities have responded to recent threats to these rents arising from litigation, legislation, and the global coronavirus pandemic.

Work in Progress

“Consumer Inattention and Insurer Incentives in the ACA Exchanges”

Abstract: In markets with significant persistence in consumer choices over time, how do changes to product characteristics affect consumer attention and inertia? I address this question in the context of individual health plan selections on the insurance exchanges established under the Affordable Care Act. Using data on the propensity of returning customers to actively select a plan rather than automatically re-enroll in their previous choice, I find that both premium increases and changes to the structure of provider networks make consumers more attentive. Estimates from a structural model of plan choices imply that switching costs for returning consumers are significantly reduced following a large premium increase by their previously chosen plan. I find no evidence that switching costs are lower following changes to provider networks.